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*Friday
21 October 1983*

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GRENADE: New Regime

The apparent execution of Prime Minister Bishop and three of his cabinet ministers is causing a wave of revulsion among regional leaders, but Havana almost certainly will support the new regime short of sending troops.

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Armed Forces Commander Austin has announced that he will head a 16-man Revolutionary Military Council that will govern "temporarily," but the role of former Deputy Prime Minister Coard in the new government is unclear.

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The Council has declared a four-day, 24-hour curfew to last until Monday morning, and curfew violators are to be shot on sight. The streets reportedly were calm on Thursday, with no apparent threat to the 800 to 1,000 US citizens in Grenada.

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Caribbean governments have reacted with shock and disgust to the deaths and the military takeover. They have called for a return to democracy in Grenada.

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Bishop stopped in Havana on 7 October on his way home from Eastern Europe, according to the US Interests Section in Havana. The press reported that Bishop spent the day visiting industrial sites in southern Cuba and President Castro was host at a reception for him that evening.

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
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Comment: The nature of the relationship between Coard and Austin is not known, so it cannot be determined whether the power struggle or the violence is over. During the crisis Havana probably decided to support whoever came to power. Castro, almost certainly concerned about US intentions, probably will move quickly to shore up the regime with intelligence and more military and political advisory assistance. [redacted]

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Havana now may have a more doctrinaire, pro-Cuban regime in Grenada, but one that will be less popular at home and less appealing in the region. The Cubans' first public statement left room for continued relations with Grenada and probably was designed to minimize criticism of the Cuban role in Grenada. Other Caribbean governments probably will ostracize the new government from regional organizations. [redacted]

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CENTRAL AMERICA: Contadora Foreign Ministers Meet

Foreign Ministers of the Contadora countries—Mexico, Venezuela, Panama, and Colombia—meet today in Panama to try to draft a treaty for later approval by the Central American countries.

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The Colombian Vice Foreign Minister told the US Embassy he anticipates that the draft treaty—based on the statement of objectives approved last month—will be short and general but will have specific annexes. According to the Panamanian Foreign Minister, supplementary agreements will be bilateral. He said Nicaragua and Honduras are already working on their own versions.

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Comment: It will be difficult to work out a draft treaty that will be acceptable to all the Central American states, and reaching subsequent agreement on specific annexes may prove impossible. Nevertheless, the current high level of tension in the region, particularly in Nicaragua, has lent a sense of urgency to the task.

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The Sandinistas apparently have justified their decisions to seek UN debate on Central America on the basis of the deteriorating security situation. No date has been set, but the Nicaraguans may try to upstage the OAS General Assembly.

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NICARAGUA: Oil Supply Problems

The Sandinistas, who are faced with the threat of more insurgent sabotage and with refusals by oil suppliers to arrange shipping, are seeking alternative means to assure resupply. [redacted]

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[redacted] the recent attack on the port of Corinto destroyed between 10 and 20 percent of the fuel capacity there—some 2.4 million to 4.8 million gallons. According to the US Embassy, however, as a result of the attack, the Sandinistas expect fuel shortages to continue at least through the end of October.

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Comment: The size of Nicaragua's oil stocks is uncertain, but until recently the Sandinistas were receiving normal oil shipments from Mexico while rationing supplies to the retail market. Earlier this month the Sandinistas increased retail fuel prices by 40 percent. These measures probably have enabled them to accumulate at least enough of a reserve to continue military operations and other essential functions. [redacted]

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
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PAKISTAN: Violent Protests Resume

Antigovernment demonstrations have flared up again in Pakistan, and there are new reports of Soviet training of Pakistani subversives.

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New violence occurred in Sind Province yesterday, although the climax of the Muslim religious holiday of Muharram passed early this week without the anticipated sectarian clashes. Opposition sources claim that at least 10 persons were killed and several hundred arrested when government militia swept through several villages in the Sind.

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Lawyers staged protest marches yesterday in nearly all of Pakistan's major cities. The most serious encounter occurred in Punjab Province, where the US Consulate in Lahore reports that an attempt by leftist students to join between 500 and 1,000 protesting lawyers was blocked by the police. The US Embassy in Islamabad reports the government is increasing pressure on the media to limit coverage of internal political developments.

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A Pakistani diplomat in Moscow has told the US Embassy that at least 200 Pakistanis, and possibly as many as 2,000, are being trained in the USSR in political subversion.

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Comment: The demonstrations by lawyers appear to be their most successful protest so far. Although the lawyers have long been the most disaffected of Pakistani opposition groups, they have not attracted much popular support. The government's efforts to limit coverage may even be provoking some larger newspapers to increase their coverage of the opposition movement.

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WESTERN EUROPE: Mass Peace Demonstrations

The peace protests throughout Western Europe this weekend are likely to attract large but generally peaceful crowds, although sporadic violence is probable in West Germany and Italy. []

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West European peace groups have carefully planned the mass demonstrations this weekend in London, Paris, Rome, Madrid, and Brussels, intending them to culminate years of opposition to INF deployments. West German missile opponents also have scheduled regional protests in Bonn, Hamburg, and Stuttgart featuring marches, peace festivals, and human chains linking important military installations. Peace groups will hold a followup demonstration in The Hague on 29 October. []

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In some countries, leftist political parties and trade unions that were ambivalent about active involvement are providing organizational support to increase the size and impact of the demonstrations. The Walloon Socialists have given a boost to the weak Belgian movement, and the Dutch Labor Party and the Trade Union Federation have increased the strength of the peace groups in the Netherlands. []

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The already large West German movement is receiving some additional support from the Social Democrats and the German Trade Union Federation. Chairman Willy Brandt is to address Bonn's big rally on Saturday. []

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The West German Government has anticipated major demonstrations. It is seeking a Bundestag mandate next month for INF deployments, in order to refute accusations of subservience to the US. []

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Comment: Demonstrations are likely to be large in all basing countries. The turnout in the UK probably will be smaller than on previous occasions, however, partially because protest activities by the women at Greenham Common have alienated moderate supporters. []

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Although most of the protests are likely to be nonviolent, autonomous and terrorist fringe groups in West Germany and Italy may try to provoke clashes with the police. The US Embassy in Rome reports that "Autonomia" terrorists are planning provocations with the Embassy as one of several targets. Nonetheless, the police are well prepared to handle demonstrations. []

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President Gnassingbe Eyadema

President since coup in 1967 . . . 47 . . . pragmatic and politically astute . . . returned country to civilian rule in 1980 . . . respected mediator in regional disputes.

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TOGO-US: President Eyadema's Visit

Moderate, pro-Western President Eyadema, who visits Washington next week, is preoccupied with Libyan efforts to undermine his regime and with the seizure of power by leftists in neighboring Ghana and Upper Volta. [REDACTED]

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As Minister of Defense, Eyadema maintains close control over the military, which is dominated by his fellow northerners. The Army was exempted from a promotion and wage freeze imposed on civilians earlier this year. [REDACTED]

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Comment: Tripoli has been trying to subvert the Togolese Government for years. Although the latest incident was not a serious threat, Libyan leader Qadhafi appears to have increased his meddling in Togo following the Libyan-backed coup in Upper Volta in August. [REDACTED]

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Togo remains dependent on France for financial and security assistance, but Eyadema may ask the US for increased economic aid and intelligence cooperation to counter the threat from Libya. [REDACTED]

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Eyadema's authoritarian rule has brought stability to Togo. Many Togolese realize that, despite Eyadema's shortcomings, they are better off than their neighbors in Ghana and Upper Volta. [REDACTED]

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Longstanding ethnic and regional differences, nevertheless, are a potential source of turbulence. Southerners, who make up nearly 40 percent of the population, resent their loss under Eyadema of political and economic dominance to northerners. [REDACTED]

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Deteriorating economic conditions could increase public dissatisfaction with the government. Earlier this month Togo rescheduled its debt for the third time since 1979 and received a standby IMF loan. The US Embassy reports that the government probably will avoid taking any additional austerity measures for fear of provoking protests. [REDACTED]

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CUBA-US: Concern About Radio Marti

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[redacted]

[redacted] a Cuban spokesman threatened publicly to "respond with all means" to Radio Marti, and Foreign Minister Malmierca later denounced it at the UN General Assembly. Havana told the US Interests Section in Havana last month that, even if Radio Marti operated within the context of the Voice of America, it almost certainly will prevent resolution of the issue of mutual radio interference. Cuban officials did not attend a meeting scheduled for yesterday with the US in Mexico City to discuss the radio interference issue. [redacted]

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Comment: Cuban jamming and counterbroadcasts to the US in English are a virtual certainty as soon as Radio Marti comes on the air. The initial counterbroadcasts, however, are unlikely to create massive interference with US commercial broadcasting stations. Havana probably will first want to evaluate the impact of Radio Marti on the Cuban population. [redacted]

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USSR: Andropov's Whereabouts

General Secretary Andropov was to visit Bulgaria on 25 October, but the US Embassy in Moscow reports that there are rumors the visit will not take place this month. [REDACTED]

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His last two reported appearances were on 18 August, when he met with US Senators in Moscow, and on 28 September, when he talked with South Yemeni leader Hasani. There is no information available on his current whereabouts. [REDACTED]

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Comment: Andropov has not made a public appearance in Moscow for over two months, which is longer than any such absence since he became General Secretary. The meeting with Hasani appears to have been outside of Moscow during Andropov's vacation. The postponement of his trip to Sofia could be due to the state of his health or to other more pressing but unpublicized activities. It does not, however, appear to result from the current tensions in relations with Sofia. [REDACTED]

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HUNGARY-USSR: Evading INF Countermeasures

Contacts of the US Embassy in Budapest claim that the regime has won the USSR's reluctant agreement not to deploy nuclear missiles in Hungary as a response to NATO INF deployments. The contacts contend that only some new Soviet missile-tracking radars will be placed in Hungary. They also say that the Soviets are urging all their Warsaw Pact allies to increase defense spending and that debate is continuing over restricting contacts with the West as a countermeasure. They are confident that Budapest will not increase its defense expenditures and will continue to maintain good relations with the West. [REDACTED]

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Comment: Short-range FROG and Scud nuclear missiles are already in Hungary and probably will be replaced eventually with SS-21 and SS-23 missiles, regardless of NATO's INF deployments. The Hungarians may have objected to a Soviet proposal for accelerating the deployment of these missiles as a public response to NATO INF. Hungary's efforts to evade participation in strong countermeasures reflect its hope of protecting relations with the West—particularly economic relations—from any increase in East-West tensions. [REDACTED]

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EC-US: Dispute on Specialty Steels

EC ministers earlier this week agreed to urge Washington to settle the dispute over US restraints on imports of specialty steels. The Community has rejected the most recent US offer to reduce tariffs on several products as compensation for the duties and quotas it imposed on EC specialty steels last July. It is seeking tariff reductions worth at least \$500 million, more than double the recent US offer, and has filed a complaint against the US with the GATT. The EC has set 30 November as the deadline for a compensation agreement with the US.

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Comment: The Community still wants to avoid aggravating the dispute, but it may retaliate unilaterally if a compensation agreement cannot be worked out soon. The ministers' deliberations indicate that EC might raise tariffs on US oranges, computers, office equipment, radio and TV equipment, textiles, and steel tube and pipe fittings. About 45 percent of US exports of computers and office equipment goes to the EC.

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
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Gulf Cooperation Council's "Peninsula Shield" Exercise, October 1983

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PERSIAN GULF: Combined Military Exercise Ends

The first combined military exercise by the six-country Gulf Cooperation Council ended last weekend in the United Arab Emirates. The maneuvers featured two assaults against fixed positions by infantry units supported by armored cars, artillery, helicopters, and fighter aircraft. Before the exercise, Kuwaiti troops moved overland some 650 kilometers to the UAE, and the Saudis flew airborne troops 1,450 kilometers across the peninsula. [REDACTED]

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Comment: The exercise seems to have gone as planned with no serious mishaps, a major accomplishment. It demonstrated the growing military cooperation among the states and their capability to transport troops and execute military maneuvers outside their home territories. Combined air and naval exercises are being planned for next year. [REDACTED]

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
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LEBANON: Shia Discontent

Continuing cease-fire violations in the suburban slums of south Beirut, where many Shia Muslims reside, underscore the potential for a renewal of major fighting if President Gemayel remains unable to start the national reconciliation talks. Although the Shia make up the country's largest sect, they have almost no help or attention from the central government. During the fighting last month, Nabih Barri, the leader of the major Shia faction, tried to extract concessions from Gemayel, but he avoided using his Amal militia against the government. If reconciliation talks falter, Barri will be under greater pressure to discard his moderate course.

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Shia leaders oppose partition because it would leave many members of the sect in south Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley under Israeli and Syrian control. They believe that a strong central authority is the only hope for a unified Shia community, and they are pushing for more Shia influence in the government. Barri and other Amal officials, however, are pessimistic about prospects for unification.

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Barri has told US Embassy officials recently that he wants increased Shia representation in the cabinet. He also will insist on more seats for the Shia in any new national assembly. Shia deputies would push for economic programs that would benefit the sect.

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In addition, Barri indicated that he wants Shia to command the Army and head the security and intelligence services, posts which traditionally are reserved for Christians. He probably calculates that this would improve the ability of the Shia to protect themselves.

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Last month, when the Lebanese Army battled Druze and Palestinian forces in the mountains of the Alayh and Ash Shuf Districts, the Druze and the Syrians urged Barri to order Shia militiamen in Beirut to stage an uprising against the government. Barri restrained his forces, however, and also refused to join the opposition National Salvation Front. The Amal leader's actions apparently reflect his belief that negotiations with the government hold the best hope for gaining Shia objectives.

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Major Shia Factions

Organization	Leader	Comments	Approximate Militia Strength
Amal (Hope)	Nabih Barri (moderate)	Barri has largest secular following in Shia community; group favors central government but demands more power for Shia; based in Beirut suburbs.	5,000
Islamic Amal	Husayn Musawi (radical)	Terrorist-prone breakaway group from Amal; Iranian-backed; aims for conversion of Lebanon into an Islamic state linked to Tehran; based in Bekaa Valley.	200 to 300 Lebanese; 500 Iranians
Hizb Allah (Party of God)	Unknown	Terrorist-prone; Iranian-backed; probably based in Bekaa Valley.	Less than 100
Union of Muslim Students	Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah (radical)	Terrorist-prone; has operational and ideological links with Islamic Amal; based in Beirut suburbs.	Less than 100
Democratic Socialist Party	Kamal al-Assad (conservative)	Kamal al-Assad is speaker of Lebanese National Assembly; leader of old-line Shia politicians; an "establishment" man; has no influence with younger Shia generation.	None
Higher Shia Islamic Council	Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din (conservative)	Shaykh Shams al-Din is recognized as religious leader of Shia community and is rival of Barri for influence among Shia.	None

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
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
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


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Tension in Beirut

The situation around Beirut airport remains potentially explosive. Opponents of Barri's moderate approach probably are fostering resentment in the surrounding Shia slums by portraying the Multinational Force as a biased occupation force that in recent weeks has directed return fire only at Muslim targets. 

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At the same time, a variety of armed groups that Barri does not control are free to initiate firefights in the area patrolled by the Multinational Force. These groups include the Lebanese Communist Party, the Communist Action Organization, and the Muslim Student Union, a pro-Iranian Shia faction that has sought to undermine Barri's leadership. 

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Outlook

To reduce the threat of a Shia uprising, government officials have argued that Shia interests can only be advanced by supporting the government and the Army. The Shia, by joining forces with Syrian-backed Lebanese factions against Gemayel, would ensure the fall of the government and the partition they want to avoid. The government's argument was persuasive during the fighting last month, even though Gemayel apparently offered no reward for Shia restraint. 

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Hints of a national redistribution of power, however, almost certainly have caused the Shia to expect that they will benefit from any new arrangements. As a result, some Shia will now be more prone to violence if they believe their aspirations are frustrated. In the event of an uprising in Beirut, the US would find it difficult to draw "red lines" in the capital or to provide significant military support to back up its commitment to the Lebanese Army. [REDACTED]

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By pursuing a negotiated settlement of Shia demands, Barri has staked at least part of his prestige on the favorable outcome of the reconciliation process. Protracted or inconclusive talks are likely to erode his influence over the Shia and result in violence that might again propel Lebanon toward an all-out civil war. [REDACTED]

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